Addressing Collective-Action Problems in Securitized Credit by Jacklin, Nancy P.
JACKLIN 11/6/2010 
 
ADDRESSING COLLECTIVE-ACTION 
PROBLEMS IN SECURITIZED CREDIT 
NANCY P. JACKLIN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the first half of the 1980s, the composition of new international credit 
shifted from mainly syndicated bank loans to predominantly capital-markets 
instruments—that is, securitized credit.1 As of the end of 2008, 84% of all credit 
in the United States was provided via capital-markets instruments with only 
16% provided via bank loans.2 Although a higher percentage of credit is 
provided through bank lending in the Eurozone (44%) and in the United 
Kingdom (46%), the share provided via credit-market instruments has been 
rising in those regions as well.3 Over the past ten years, a substantial percentage 
of that capital-markets-based financing has taken the form of private-label, 
asset-backed securities. Global private-label securitization soared from almost 
nothing in the late 1990s to peak at close to five trillion dollars in 2006.4 These 
trends in the international securitization of credit have presented a number of 
challenges for the prevention and containment of financial crises, and 
accordingly for managing systemic risk. 
One consequence of securitization is that the wide and increasingly 
international sale and distribution of securities disperses credit ownership. This 
distribution has a potential benefit of reducing the concentration of credit in 
any single credit provider. But the dispersion also has the certain consequence 
of spreading the effects of an adverse credit event widely when it occurs. The 
wide dispersion of ownership across diverse investors with disparate interests 
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[hereinafter GFSR]. 
JACKLIN 11/6/2010 
176 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:175 
can also make it difficult to achieve the authorizations or agreements needed 
for an orderly resolution of severely distressed debt. 
If the potential negative effects of debt default on financial markets and the 
real economy are substantial, this collective-action problem in resolving 
distressed debt is not solely a concern of the affected debtors and creditors, but 
it becomes a public-policy concern. Whenever an issuer of debt instruments is 
subject to a statutory and judicial regime that provides a framework for 
equitable restructuring of debt or an orderly liquidation in bankruptcy, the 
potential for disorder and contagion are reduced. In the absence of such a legal 
regime, contractual or other institutional arrangements may provide a 
substitute framework for reorganization of debts.5 
The collective-action problem in restructuring sovereign debt in the 1990s 
and early 2000s was one aspect of securitization that made the sovereign debt 
crises of those years more difficult to resolve than the comparable problems of 
the 1980s. The collective-action problem appeared again as a hindrance to 
containing the current subprime crisis. In both cases, the lack of an effective 
framework for creditors and debtors to address severe financial distress caused 
by significant levels of debt had negative implications for the international 
economy. The financial and legal structures of securitized credit failed to 
anticipate the potential for such severe distress and, when it occurred, there was 
no clear path to resolve it. Thus, in both the sovereign debt and subprime crises, 
containing the risk caused by a major credit event became more difficult and 
called for significant public resources to mitigate the adverse effects. 
Since the onset of the current financial crisis, much has been written about 
what needs to be done to prevent similar catastrophes in the future. Preventing 
and containing systemic risks in the international financial system will require a 
host of reforms in terms of macroeconomic and financial policies, financial-
system structure and regulation, and institutional governance and performance 
in both the public and private sectors.6 One lesson from the sovereign debt 
crises of the past, however, is that credit mechanisms lacking a framework for 
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 6. See, e.g., FIN. SERV. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE 
GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf 
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2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Treasury, 
Treasury Outlines Framework for Regulatory Reform (Mar. 26, 2009), available at http:// 
www.treasury.gov/press/releases/tg72.htm. 
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orderly resolution of severely distressed debt are an invitation to financial crisis. 
Because securitized credit is likely to remain an important segment of 
international finance, and because securitizations inevitably make collective 
action more complex,7 both market participants and systemic-risk overseers 
need to proactively assure that the mechanisms are in place to resolve 
distressed debt even in extreme events. 
II 
HOW SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES WERE RESOLVED IN THE ERA OF 
SYNDICATED BANK LOANS 
It is useful to consider how the framework for resolving international 
financial crises functioned in the 1980s, when most credit was provided through 
commercial bank loans. Although the challenges for crisis management seemed 
Herculean at the time, neither the added complexities of large volumes of 
sovereign debt evidenced by capital-markets instruments (which occurred in the 
1990s), nor a financial market driven by advanced financial engineering (as we 
have today), were yet factors in managing systemic risk. 
A number of economic, financial, and political factors resulted in the 
buildup of high levels of external debt by a number of developing countries in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Much of the debt was U.S. dollar–denominated, 
and the interest payments had floating rates linked to the London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR). Once the United States and a number of other 
industrial countries adopted substantially tighter monetary policies to control 
inflation in the early 1980s (affecting interest rates and exchange rates), the 
debt burdens of these countries became unsustainable. First Mexico in 1982,8 
then Brazil, Argentina, Chile, the Philippines, and a number of other countries 
in Latin America and Eastern Europe were effectively unable to meet their 
foreign debts when contractually due.9 
The majority of that debt took the form of commercial bank loans that were 
generally syndicated by the internationally active money-center banks to a 
broader segment of the banking community in the United States and abroad. 
The original sources of these funds were the balance-of-payments surpluses of 
the oil-exporting states. The international banking system “recycled” the 
 
 7. See GFSR, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
 8. Poland defaulted on approximately eight billion dollars in external debt in March 1981, but the 
size and scope of the global crisis attracted heightened government concern when Mexico’s difficulties 
became known. LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD HOC 
MACHINERY 102, 156 (2003). 
 9. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT: SYSTEMIC RISK AND POLICY RESPONSE 
1–19 (1984) (describing the origins of the 1980s debt crisis and its resolution); PAUL A. VOLCKER & 
TOYOO GYOHTEN, CHANGING FORTUNES: THE WORLD'S MONEY AND THE THREAT TO AMERICAN 
LEADERSHIP 187–227 (1992) (same). 
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petrodollars, and the oil-exporting countries thereby indirectly financed much 
of the debt arising from the higher oil-import bills of developing countries.10 
The potential defaults on the very sizeable obligations of the debtor 
countries posed risks to the international financial system as a whole in two 
ways. First, in many cases, the loans made by the major money-center banks to 
sovereign borrowers dwarfed the capital available to those banks for reserves or 
write-offs of the troubled debts. Thus, if defaults on the debt owed to these 
banks occurred, an “old fashioned” banking crisis was a possibility. Second, if 
all of the insolvent debtor countries had to make the economic adjustments 
necessary to quickly generate the resources needed to meet all outstanding 
debt, such an abrupt retrenchment could severely harm not only their domestic 
economies, but all the economies to which they were linked globally. Thus, the 
imminent default, first by Mexico and then by many others, was a public-policy 
concern that required concerted action to prevent these negative consequences 
for the financial system and the global economy.11 
With the leadership of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
United States, the public sector and the international banking community 
worked to develop a process for an orderly resolution of the crisis—in 
particular, a mechanism to give banks the time to boost their earnings and their 
capital to absorb the risks on their books, and the debtors the time to take the 
economic-adjustment measures needed to restore external viability. In most 
cases the IMF had a critical role in assessing the credibility of the debtor’s 
economic-adjustment program and determining what level of adjustment or 
belt-tightening was achievable. The IMF program essentially established how 
much external financing would be needed during the adjustment period. The 
IMF had some resources to help meet those needs and some other official-
sector funds might have been forthcoming, but the sizes of the “financing gaps” 
for these debtors could not be met by government assistance alone. Moreover, 
the public sector was not disposed as a policy matter to “bailing out” the 
imprudent decisions of the marketplace. Essentially, the IMF program defined 
the size of the contribution that the commercial-bank lenders were expected to 
make—thus the term “bail-out” was properly replaced with the term “bail-in.”12 
The large money-center banks—with substantial loans to sovereigns 
potentially in default, and with their reputations as major syndicate leaders 
further at stake—were motivated to work with the public sector within the 
foregoing framework to resolve the crisis. As the “agent banks” in the 
syndicated credits, they had responsibilities to collect and distribute payments 
on the loans for the hundreds of other banks in their syndicates and to convey 
important information to the other banks. But they had authority neither to 
amend key financial terms in the loans on their own nor to obtain net new 
 
 10. VOLCKER & GYOHTEN, supra note 9, at 187–227. 
 11. CLINE, supra note 9, at 21–29; RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 155–56. 
 12. CLINE, supra note 9, at 29–32; VOLCKER & GYOHTEN, supra note 9, at 200–07. 
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financing from banks in the syndicate. Thus, even in the simplified world of 
commercial-bank loans as the main channel of credit, there were collective-
action challenges to resolving distressed debt.13 
The banks were experienced in addressing distressed corporate credits, 
though, and they used that model to organize creditor committees vis-à-vis each 
debtor country, both as a point of contact and discussion with the debtor and as 
a channel of communication with other creditors. The committees and their 
chairmen also became important points of contact with the IMF and other 
public-sector collaborators in the resolution of the crisis. One of the most 
difficult hurdles was to persuade all the banks in the syndicates to put in their 
proportional share of new money commitments. To facilitate the process, the 
public sector used a number of carrots—such as regulatory forbearance on the 
reserving rules on those loans—and sticks—such as IMF threats not to disburse 
its own funds without a critical mass of committed private-sector financing. 
Over time, as serial restructuring of each country’s debt began to wear down the 
patience of all the participants, multi-year restructurings took their place. Over 
a seven-year period, more of the bank lenders had a chance to rebuild earnings 
and capital, and several were actively looking for a way to transform their bank 
loans into more-liquid assets. Many were anxious to spend fewer resources and 
less time on the crisis in less-developed countries and to focus on other 
business.14 
In 1989, the Brady Plan was launched by the U.S. Treasury. Under that plan, 
bank loans were converted to marketable, collateralized bonds. Those 
exchanges resulted in the banks’ writing off a portion of the debt principal or 
reducing interest payments, and improving the banks’ credit risk through 
collateral arrangements. By this time, Citibank had unilaterally declared a 
write-down of another twenty percent of the face value of the sovereign debt on 
its books, and a number of other banks followed, giving them considerable 
flexibility in future restructurings. Thus began a period of debt forgiveness and 
the “securitization” of sovereign debt. As more restructurings created even 
more-varied and interesting securities in the “exchange offers” for outstanding 
loans, an active trading business in all of the debt instruments flourished. Over 
time, new groups of investors (for example, mutual funds, pension funds, and 
insurance companies) in emerging-markets debt developed as the debtor 
countries’ economic and financial strength grew and the potential returns 
appeared more attractive. The debtors thus began obtaining substantial 
 
 13. See 1 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS ch. 7 (Robert C. Effros ed. 
1992). 
 14. See Andrew Yianni, Proposed New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, XII CENTRAL 
BANKING 3, 84–86 (2002); see also RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 95–131, 162–68 (discussing the Bank 
Advisory Committee process for restructuring sovereign debt owed to commercial banks); VOLCKER & 
GYOHTEN, supra note 9, at 207–19 (discussing the aftermath of the Latin American crisis). 
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amounts of new financing through international bond issues as a routine part of 
their public finance.15 
The crisis resolution framework of the 1980s shared a number of key 
elements: 
1. Although the bank loans were widely syndicated, making 
restructuring of the distressed debt more complex, all the lenders were 
commercial banks. Most had suffered similar regulatory and 
accounting consequences from defaults or restructuring decisions, all 
had experience with and accepted the concept of debt work-outs, and 
all held claims of equal rank or priority. Thus, reaching agreement on 
the terms of a restructuring was aided by the creditors’ essentially 
similar interests. 
2. In lieu of a bankruptcy regime for assuring an independent 
assessment of the fairness of restructuring the debtor’s and the 
creditors’ interests, an IMF program gave some assurance to the 
creditors that the debtor was engaged in good-faith economic reforms 
and that a third party monitored ongoing progress on those reforms to 
provide some confidence that the restructured loans would be repaid 
when due. 
3. The syndicated loans themselves had provisions to ease agreement 
on the restructuring terms and to discourage free riders. A key 
provision was that any recoveries by any individual creditor had to be 
shared among all creditors pari passu (facilitating collaborative 
actions). Moreover, to discourage debtors from catering to hold-outs, 
the agreement included mandatory prepayment provisions, which 
provided that if a bank eligible to participate in a restructuring 
agreement did not do so and obtained better terms, the banks that had 
agreed to the restructuring agreement could generally insist on the 
same terms as the hold-out bank. Although some hold-outs appeared 
in reschedulings, these tended to be sufficiently minor, so that the 
deals got done and life moved on.16 
4. The public and private sectors cooperated to resolve the crisis in 
the context of an equitable framework—the debtor countries had to 
undertake significant economic adjustments, the creditors had to 
provide significant net financing to allow an orderly adjustment 
period, and the broader international community provided some 
bridge financing, some regulatory forbearance, and the institutional 
imprimatur of the IMF to give the process credibility. 
 
 15. RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 168–77; VOLCKER & GYOHTEN, supra note 9, at 207–19. 
 16. At a late stage in the Brady bond restructurings, some agreements also included provisions by 
which key financial terms could be amended by specified majority votes (albeit a 75–85% majority), 
thereby allowing for a “cramdown” of the restructuring terms on nonconsenting minority creditors. 
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Thus, in the era of syndicated commercial-bank credit, a framework existed 
for working out distressed sovereign debt in an orderly way without 
jeopardizing the financial system as a whole and leaving the public sector with 
the enormous financial consequences of such an event. 
III 
THE COLLECTIVE-ACTION PROBLEM IN SECURITIZED SOVEREIGN DEBT 
Mexico’s debt crisis of 1994 and how it was resolved demonstrate stark 
differences with the preceding era. In contrast with the 1980s, by 1994, credit 
was obtained by sovereigns in much larger amounts through the capital markets 
than through traditional bank loans, and the levels of that debt grew as 
emerging-market economies grew. As countries increasingly saw the benefits of 
this financing, global capital markets became much more open and unregulated. 
The bondholders of emerging-market debt in the 1990s included financial 
institutions (holding the debt in both trading and investment accounts), other 
institutional investors (such as mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance 
companies looking for diversification and higher yields), expatriates, and retail 
investors (typically in those countries without customer “suitability” 
requirements in their regulation of brokers and investment advisors, or where 
such requirements had not been observed). Investors were not only 
geographically diverse, but given the nature of their various institutions, their 
motivations and the time horizons were vastly so, as were differences in the 
regulatory and accounting rules affecting their holdings and potential 
restructuring of the bonds they owned. Moreover, many of the investors held 
their investments through third parties, so determining the identity of the 
beneficial owners could be difficult.17 
When Mexico’s political turmoil and financial difficulties led to a potential 
default on fifteen billion dollars of short-term, external government bonds in 
the spring of 1994, the U.S. Treasury became concerned about the shock this 
default could cause to the financial system and its potential spill-over effects on 
other countries. The shock would come partly from the 1980s practice of 
excluding bond indebtedness from sovereign debt restructurings. Such exclusion 
was possible when bonds were a small portion of a country’s overall 
indebtedness. There were difficulties as well in applying the restructuring 
paradigm of the 1980s to the 1994 crisis: there were no creditor committees of 
bondholders to organize a standstill and negotiate a restructuring agreement; 
the terms of the Mexican bond contracts (governed by New York law) had no 
“majority action” provisions, so every bondholder had the legal right to 
accelerate debt in default and sue to recover; and the variety of locations and 
 
 17. RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 190–93; GROUP OF TEN, THE RESOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN 
LIQUIDITY CRISES ¶¶ 10–15 (1996), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten03.pdf?noframes=1 
[hereinafter Rey Report]. 
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interests of the various classes of bondholders made reaching a relatively quick 
and orderly resolution exceedingly difficult.18 
In these circumstances, the United States led the international official 
community in supporting a fifty-billion-dollar rescue package to staunch capital 
outflows from Mexico, with the effect of bailing out Mexico’s bondholders (as 
well as financing other such “capital flight”). Notwithstanding the international 
community’s aim of preventing contagion to other countries, the crisis shattered 
investor confidence in other emerging-market borrowers and caused severe 
restrictions on capital-markets access for Argentina, Brazil, and others.19 
Although the international community collaborated to provide this massive 
public-sector support to Mexico in 1994, the moral hazard its action posed to 
maintaining financial discipline in debtor countries and among international 
investors led to extensive discussion on how to improve the sovereign debt 
crisis-prevention and crisis-resolution framework. Moreover, the magnitude of 
international capital flows to emerging-markets countries dwarfed the available 
amounts of public-sector resources, making public bailouts of all countries that 
might face capital flight increasingly difficult as a practical matter, even if this 
had been viewed as acceptable as a policy matter. After the Asian debt crisis 
and the Russian default in the late 1990s, the pressure for substantial reform 
became even greater. Russia’s financial crisis in 1998 was the clearest example 
of moral hazard in action. For a number of years in the lead-up to the crisis, the 
IMF and the international public sector supported Russia with a series of IMF 
programs on which Russia failed to perform. When the IMF finally pulled the 
plug and stopped lending in 1998, Russia defaulted on its massive debt to the 
private sector. Its investors had continued to provide financing, notwithstanding 
plenty of solid information on Russia’s dire financial condition, in the belief that 
Russia was “too nuclear to fail”—that is, the investors assumed that they would 
in the end be bailed out as Mexico was in 1994. The shock of Russia’s default 
caused a true international financial crisis, with a massive flight of investors to 
the safety and quality of U.S. Treasury securities and little else.20 
From 1996 through 2000 a flurry of public- and private-sector proposals 
were made (and a number of concrete actions in fact taken) to strengthen the 
architecture for sovereign debt crisis prevention and resolution.21 Most had 
these elements in common: 
 
 18. PETER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: WHAT’S NEW? 
WHAT’S MISSING? 19–26 (2001); RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 198–202; Rey Report, supra note 17, at ¶¶ 
36–45, 53–65. 
 19. By 1995, Mexico did adopt a strong economic-adjustment program and moved to a more 
flexible, essentially floating exchange rate, repaid its debt to the IMF and bilateral official creditors, 
restored a sustainable balance of payments position, and attained renewed access to international 
capital markets. RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 198–202. 
 20. See, e.g., KENEN, supra note 18, at 26–47; RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 203–11. 
 21. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, REVIEWING THE PROCESS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING WITHIN THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK (2003), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/080103.pdf. 
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1. A recognition that crisis resolution is far more complex when a 
wide variety of institutional and individual investors hold sovereign 
debt; 
2. An acceptance, therefore, that crisis prevention was even more 
important than in the past, and this required a number of 
improvements in economic- and debt-sustainability surveillance by the 
IMF, financial-system regulation and supervision, data gathering and 
disclosure by debtors to their investors, and “self-insurance” by the 
debtor countries; 
3. A recognition that bondholders could not expect to be “senior” or 
their holdings classified as “excluded” debt when a sovereign’s debt 
load became unsustainable and needed to be restructured (this point 
was emphasized by the 1999 restructuring of the bonds issued by 
Pakistan); and 
4. A recognition that a framework was needed to make an orderly 
restructuring of sovereign-bond indebtedness less complex 
(notwithstanding the restructuring of sovereign bonds in a number of 
sovereign-bond exchanges that occurred over this period in 
conjunction with large IMF programs of support). 
In this regard, the Group of Ten’s 1996 Rey Report22 first recommended that 
sovereign bonds include the same types of collective-action clauses that were 
standard in English-law-governed Eurobonds, including those issued by 
sovereigns.23 These clauses would allow for majority action to restructure 
financial terms and to accelerate the debt repayment only by a decision of the 
majority, not by individual creditors; the clauses would also require pro rata 
sharing of any recoveries made by individual creditors should they take action 
by litigation, set-off, or otherwise. Such modifications should facilitate orderly 
restructurings. In contrast to English-law-governed bonds, New York–law-
governed sovereign bonds had been patterned on the forms used for corporate 
bonds issued in accordance with the Trust Indenture Act.24 That Act gave 
extensive protections to individual bondholders, including protections for 
minority bondholders.25 
 
 22. Rey Report, supra note 17, at 46–47. 
 23. For a discussion of the collective-action clauses in English-law-governed Eurobonds and a 
comparison with New York–law-governed bonds, see Andrew Yianni, Resolution of Sovereign 
Financial Crises—Evolution of the Private Sector Restructuring Process, FIN. STABILITY REV., June 
1999, at 80–81. 
 24. See Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1627, 1683–84 (2006); Rey Report, supra note 17, at 45–46. 
 25. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 24, at 1683–84. In the corporate bond context, these 
protections were not inappropriate, as U.S. bankruptcy-code provisions assured equitable treatment of 
debtors and various classes of creditors in a corporate reorganization. 
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It was not until the Argentine financial crisis in 2001—and a series of failed 
IMF-approved economic programs—that the public sector became more 
assertive about the need to improve the framework for sovereign debt 
restructurings.26 In addition to the Argentine crisis, a series of large IMF 
programs and support packages—for Brazil and Turkey, in particular—had 
signaled the need for a system under which the private sector made a greater 
contribution to crisis avoidance and resolution.27 
In the fall of 2001, two key alternative proposals for improving the sovereign 
debt-restructuring framework were put forward: the Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) and the adoption of Collective-Action 
Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds. The SDRM—first proposed by First 
Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, Anne Krueger—would give the IMF a 
more intrusive role in the debt-restructuring process and, most importantly, 
would allow the IMF to “sanction” a standstill in the payment of sovereign debt 
when necessary to facilitate an orderly restructuring. The investor community 
was vehemently opposed to this plan, especially due to this potential suspension 
of their basic contract rights. The issuers, for their part, were concerned that the 
plan would increase their costs of financing and indeed might scare off the 
capital markets to a large extent.28 
The alternative, market-based solution proposed by the Under Secretary of 
the Treasury, John Taylor, was for the market participants to include CACs 
(along the lines proposed in 1996 in the Rey Report) in all future sovereign 
bond offerings.29 Thus, bondholders would effectively recognize that their claims 
were not exempt from restructuring and that they had a responsibility to work 
with the debtor in distress for an orderly resolution of debt problems. For their 
part, issuers would recognize that they had a responsibility to work with their 
creditors in advance of extreme distress and that the international official 
community should not be the presumed savior. There was a continued 
recognition of the role of IMF programs and of reasonable, finite amounts of 
official resources in support of such a restructuring. 
 
 26. RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 251–56. Argentina’s crisis led to a massive default in early 2002 on 
forty-seven billion dollars of external debt as well as default on its domestic debts. It is not clear that 
any improved restructuring framework would have made Argentine debt resolution orderly in view of 
the country’s complex and difficult politics, its soured relations with the IMF at that time, its diversity in 
geography and type of bondholders holding the debt, and the sheer extent of economic adjustment 
required. Argentina’s political, economic, and financial problems had become extreme due to its failure 
to confront at an earlier date the intractable external imbalances produced by a fixed exchange-rate 
regime. See JOHN B. TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCIAL WARRIORS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD 70–97 (2007). 
 27. NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? RESPONDING TO THE 
FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 61–63, 65–66 (2004). 
 28. See generally RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 250–53, 266–71 (discussing Krueger’s role upon arriving 
at the IMF and the features of the SDRM); Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 24, at 1631. 
 29. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 111–18; John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y of Treasury for Int’l Affairs, 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective, Remarks at the Institute for International 
Economics Conference: Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards? (Apr. 2, 2002), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po2056.htm. 
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The active and serious discussion at the IMF of the SDRM no doubt had a 
motivating role in getting investors and issuers to increasingly consider the use 
of CACs. Yet the discussions ended up in a complete standoff between the 
issuers and investors in September 2002, for many reasons: The investors were a 
diverse group, including “vulture” funds whose modus operandi was to buy 
distressed sovereign debt at a deep discount and to sue for recovery of the face 
value once restructuring talks were imminent or underway (and who therefore 
strongly opposed creditor contract provisions under which a majority could 
determine the fate of all those holding relevant instruments), more-traditional 
distressed-debt investors, emerging-market-debt traders, and a wide range of 
institutional investors. Each class of investors had unique financial interests 
dependent on its motivations for investment, other business interests in the 
emerging markets, and accounting and regulatory regimes. So each class sought 
different tradeoffs for any documentation concession to issuers. The sovereign 
issuers, for their part, objected to many of the investor tradeoffs, and by 
requesting the adoption of CACs, they did not want to imply that they had any 
intention to default on their debt in the future. Moreover, they were concerned 
about the effect of such clauses on their cost of borrowing.30 
After the standoff, in the interests of the international financial system as a 
whole, the U.S. Treasury in particular became much more active in cajoling 
issuers to take the leap individually or collectively to issue their new 
international bonds with CACs. It was not until February 2003 (over seven 
years after the Rey Report recommendations) that Mexico courageously led the 
way with an SEC-registered global note containing CACs. By moving first, it 
took the risk of increased funding costs, but it also gained the advantage of 
setting the terms of the new clauses. As it happened, the market did not impose 
any cost for the documentation changes on Mexico or on any of the other 
sovereign issuers who followed. The other benefit of Mexico’s action was that 
the SDRM was pulled off the IMF’s work agenda, and the constant talk of 
potential sovereign defaults—which might chill market access—was put to an 
end.31 
At about the same time, Uruguay (which had suffered contagion from 
Argentina’s 2001 debt default) had successfully negotiated a restructuring of its 
debt in the context of an IMF program and thus had avoided default. As in the 
1980s, the IMF program affirmed the acceptable parameters of Uruguay’s 
economic adjustment, thereby defining the financing gap that needed to be 
filled during the adjustment period, and Uruguay worked with the public and 
private sectors to fill the gap. Uruguay completed its 2003 debt-exchange offer, 
which was sufficient to meet the private-sector contribution to the needed 
financing. Moreover, the debt exchange was adopted at a very high acceptance 
 
 30. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 127–30; Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 24, at 1631. 
 31. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 127–30; Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 24, at 1631. 
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rate by investors and included in the new bond offerings CACs with no cost to 
the issuer.32 
Thus was established the framework for crisis resolution for sovereign debt, 
including sovereign bonds. Although this framework does not assure that 
sovereign debt crises will be avoided or that contagion from one country to 
others will not occur, it at least provides a path for avoiding default and for 
avoiding a chaotic resolution of distressed debt in the future. 
This experience with the securitization of sovereign debt offers several 
lessons: 
1. Securitization created a great diversity and variety in the interests 
of the sovereign’s creditors, making resolution of a financial crisis 
more difficult and complex; 
2. This necessitated far greater attention to crisis prevention on the 
part of the sovereign borrowers as well as the international 
community; 
3. For these capital-markets activities to continue without 
jeopardizing the stability of the international financial system as a 
whole, there needed to be a framework acceptable to the relevant 
market participants for addressing distressed debt in a reasonably 
orderly way even in cases of extreme distress; and 
4. Creating a stronger crisis-prevention and resolution framework 
required the active collaboration of the private and public sectors. 
Moreover, there was a clear need for the public sector to drive 
reforms: the differing interests of diverse market participants, each of 
whom would be motivated primarily by private advantage and not the 
public good, were unlikely to produce the results required for the 
safety of the financial system as a whole. 
These lessons needed to be applied more broadly as the international 
financial system grew more complex in the years that followed. 
IV 
THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE COLLECTIVE-ACTION PROBLEM 
Securitization of credit has reached new dimensions of complexity in the 
current decade. In the 1990s, we were coping with the mere conversion of bank 
loans to sovereign bonds sold in international capital markets. This created far 
less-difficult risk-management challenges than the securitization of credit 
through advanced financial engineering, which characterizes the financial 
 
 32. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 21, at 33–34. 
JACKLIN 11/6/2010 
Fall 2010]  ADDRESSING COLLECTIVE-ACTION PROBLEMS IN SECURITIZED CREDIT 187 
markets today. These challenges are well illustrated in the private-label33 
residential-mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) market. 
The U.S. subprime residential mortgages, at the heart of the current global 
financial crisis, were pooled into special purpose vehicles or trusts, against 
which securities were issued and sold to diverse investors around the world. The 
securities were often “tranched” to create different priorities for different 
classes of investors respecting the trust assets, increasing the complexity of these 
securitizations. In some cases, securities were enhanced by third-party 
guarantors or swap providers—who themselves had a specified priority of claim 
on the trust. Further complexity could be added by pooling the trust securities 
themselves into another trust, usually with the effect of increasing the leverage 
in the structure and diversity of investor interests. If the trusts—which typically 
held assets with long maturities—were funded in part by short-term borrowing, 
as was often the case, substantial liquidity risk was added to credit risk in the 
structures.34 
The transfer of credit risk on the residential mortgages from the originators 
(generally banks or specialized mortgage lenders) to a wide range of other 
investors was thought to make the financial system safer—that is, the transfer 
should result in less risk concentration and therefore a greater capacity of the 
market to absorb the credit risk on the assets. In fact, the complexity, 
opaqueness, and the financial and legal structure of this credit mechanism 
caused serious credit deterioration in a fairly narrow segment of world financial 
markets (the U.S. subprime residential-mortgage market) to become the source 
of a major financial panic and global recession.35 
At the heart of the subprime crisis was a seriously flawed, sometimes 
fraudulent, underwriting process that created high-risk residential-mortgage 
loans that were repackaged, sold, and often repackaged again, into securities 
carrying investment-grade bond ratings. The structure and pricing of the 
securitizations and their credit ratings were premised on flawed risk models, 
often using historical loss ratios on prime mortgages. The mortgages themselves 
were overly leveraged, as were the trusts against which the securities were 
issued and the third-party guarantors that enhanced these structures. The risks 
in these products were inadequately disclosed; diligence by investors, 
guarantors, and ratings agencies was inadequate; and, when the bubble burst, 
information was lacking as to where these widely sold and potentially toxic 
assets resided throughout the international financial system. When the U.S. 
residential-real-estate bubble burst and the credit ratings on the RMBS were 
 
 33. These are the residential-mortgage-backed securities created by sponsors other than 
government-sponsored entities such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
 34. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, POLICY STATEMENT ON 
FINANCIAL MARKETS DEVELOPMENTS 1–9 (2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ 
reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf [hereinafter PWG 2008]; Randall Dodd, Subprime: 
Tentacles of a Crisis, IMF FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2007, at 15–19. 
 35. GFSR, supra note 4. 
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lowered, fear about the size, scope, and distribution of the potential credit 
losses led to a financial panic characterized by heavy asset liquidations and a 
global flight to quality. Thus, the credit excesses in the U.S. subprime 
residential-mortgage market became magnified and distributed globally by 
virtue of the securitization process used.36 
The legal and financial structure of the RMBS made the crisis exceedingly 
difficult to resolve. First, the complexity and opaqueness of the securitization 
structures made it very hard to ascertain the fair value of these assets and thus 
determine the true financial condition of the financial institutions carrying them 
on their books. Thus, determining how best to deal with the impact of the crisis 
on the financial sector and credit markets was likewise extremely difficult.37 
Second, addressing the underlying problem of bad mortgage loans and the 
risks to the economy of widespread foreclosures was more difficult, still. The 
collective-action problem for orderly resolution of the distressed debt in the 
RMBS trusts was far more complex than that confronted in the sovereign-bond 
restructurings of the 1990s. Like the sovereign debt of the 1990s, RMBS were 
not subject to a bankruptcy or other established regime that would create a 
framework for a reorganization of the underlying debt. The RMBS were 
intentionally structured so that the trusts were “bankruptcy remote,” and the 
underlying mortgage loans in the trusts also had certain protections from 
modification in bankruptcy. Thus, it was the contract terms of the RMBS that 
determined the structure for dealing with distressed debt in the trusts.38 
The collective-action problem in resolving distressed debt in the trusts was 
not one of merely organizing highly diverse and dispersed investors (much like 
the problem in the sovereign bonds of the 1990s), but of dealing with investors 
with different priorities of claims against the trust issuer. In addition, the 
distressed assets were themselves claims on a multitude of debtors and involved 
diverse collateral in the form of individual home mortgages. So a collective-
 
 36. PWG 2008, supra note 34; INT’L MONETARY FUND, THE RECENT TURMOIL—INITIAL 
ASSESSMENT, POLICY LESSONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUND SURVEILLANCE 1–10, (2008), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/040908.pdf; TURNER REVIEW, supra note 6, at 
11–28. 
 37. It was much harder to stabilize the financial system following the current crisis than it was 
following the sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s, when banks and regulators could fairly quickly 
determine the risk exposures of individual banks and the amount of capital needed to rebuild their 
balance sheets. In contrast, in 2008 and 2009, the Bush Administration and the Obama Administration, 
as well as governments of foreign countries whose financial systems were adversely affected, struggled 
to determine which institutions had large risk exposures, how to measure potential losses, and whether 
capital infusions or government programs to purchase “toxic assets” or government guarantees of bank 
debt could best address the risks to the global financial system. Bank for Int’l Settlements, BIS 
Quarterly Review, Dec. 2008, at 10–11, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0812.pdf; Henry 
M. Paulson, Jr., U.S. Treasury Sec’y, Remarks at The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (Nov. 20, 
2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1285.htm; U.S. Treasury Department, Fact 
Sheet: Financial Stability Plan, Feb. 9, 2009, available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/fact-
sheet.pdf. 
 38. Anne Gelpern & Adam Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in 
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1117 (2009). 
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action problem affected not only the diversity of the investors but also the 
diversity of the debtors and the collateral supporting the debts. 
The contracts that governed the RMBS reflected the practical reality that 
individual investors needed to delegate to an agent the ability to deal with 
assets in the trust that were in default or that might potentially default.39 The 
servicer of the loans, who collected and disbursed payments to the trust and 
investors, was typically delegated that responsibility in the Master Pooling and 
Servicing Agreement (MPSA). The terms of the RMBS, including the MPSA, 
were designed to maximize investor interest in acquiring the securities, 
including obtaining the highest credit ratings possible. Moreover, unlike the 
debtors of sovereign bonds, the ultimate “debtors” of the assets in the trust 
(that is, the homeowners with mortgages in the trusts) had no voice in designing 
what procedures would be applied should their ability to repay or refinance 
their obligations become seriously impaired. For both these reasons, the terms 
of the MPSA were clearly investor friendly.40 Further, in an economic 
environment in which housing prices seemed ever on the rise, the sponsors of 
the securitizations and the credit-rating agencies that facilitated the growth of 
the business adopted a financial and legal framework for the RMBS that 
assumed default rates based on historical averages in the U.S. residential-
mortgage markets (which had been dominated by prime lending, not the more-
recent subprime standards).41 And they surely did not contemplate or provide 
for the contingency of widespread defaults, market contagion, and a severe 
economic downturn. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the MPSAs had a number of features that 
made orderly workouts of distressed residential mortgages held by the trusts 
particularly difficult. Some contracts severely limited the scope of the servicer’s 
rights to make material modifications in the mortgage-loan terms, particularly 
in advance of an actual default. Others may have granted broad discretion, but 
in doing so failed to establish a clear standard for servicer conduct. In both 
cases, the servicer was concerned about liability and thus was reluctant to act 
(particularly when there were competing creditor priorities, such that any action 
would likely favor one class of creditor over another). Indeed, there were no 
established industry or contractual standards by which the performance of 
servicers dealing with distressed debt in RMBS trusts would be judged; yet the 
trustees on behalf of bondholders had the authority to replace the servicers. 
The manner in which the servicer was compensated also affected the actions it 
 
 39. A default by a mortgagor on an asset held by the trust does not trigger a default on the RMBS. 
Rather, the rights of the investor vis-à-vis the servicer, and the rights and duties of the servicer when 
such a default occurs are set out in the contract terms. 
 40. Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 38, at 1124; Larry Cordell et al., The Incentives of Mortgage 
Servicers: Myths and Realities 3 (Federal Reserve Board Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 
Staff Working Paper No. 46, 2008); John P. Hunt, What Do Subprime Securitization Contracts Actually 
Say About Loan Modification?, BERKELEY LAW, UNIV. OF CAL. CTR. FOR LAW, BUS., AND THE 
ECON. 1 (2009). 
 41. PWG 2008, supra note 34, at 14; INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 36, at 6–7. 
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was willing to take: reimbursement for out-of-pocket foreclosure expenses was 
often more easily collected than the administrative costs of negotiating a 
workout. And because the sponsors of and investors in securitizations did not 
contemplate the potential for extreme debt distress, many servicers lacked the 
personnel and resources, no less the expertise, to handle potential workouts on 
the scale that materialized in this crisis.42 
Some of the foregoing obstacles to mortgage workouts were addressed at 
least in part by the U.S. government and by the mortgage industry. Congress 
authorized government payments to compensate servicers for some of the 
added costs of workouts. And the mortgage industry agreed on standards for 
acceptable workout options to facilitate quicker responses and to mitigate 
servicer-liability risk.43 Nonetheless, problems persisted in addressing the 
distressed debt and in preventing foreclosures. 
The longer the delay in resolving the distressed-mortgage debt, the higher 
the rate of home foreclosures, and the greater the downward pressure on home 
prices. This in turn exacerbated the financial-industry distress and economic-
feedback effects on the economy, thereby deepening the crisis.44 Part of the 
problem in preventing foreclosures as the crisis played out was that the 
persistent decline in home prices and increasing unemployment made many 
debtors likely to be either unwilling or unable to service restructured loans, 
even with substantial financial concessions. In both cases, the option of 
foreclosure would likely appear preferable to servicers and investors.45 
The subprime crisis reinforces the lessons from the sovereign debt crises of 
the 1980s and 1990s regarding the costs of the collective-action problem posed 
by securitized credit: First, securitization creates a diversity of investors (and in 
the case of pooled assets, a diversity of debtors as well), making more complex 
and difficult the resolution of distressed debt; and the more complex and 
opaque the structures and diverse the investor interests, the greater these 
difficulties are. Second, crisis-prevention measures are therefore all the more 
important. For example, credit standards need to be robust and observed; risk 
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Secretary-Donovan-and-FDIC-Cha/. 
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must not be disguised through overly complex and opaque instruments; risk 
needs to be properly compensated; leverage must not be excessive; risk models 
should not be based on flawed historical data and should incorporate the 
potential of extreme risk events; and market, liquidity, and credit risks all must 
be soundly assessed.46 Third, credit mechanisms must provide a framework for 
resolving distressed debt in an orderly way. No matter how intelligently risk 
appears to be managed, credit and market risks can cause unanticipated 
defaults. A framework that is not adequate to address a situation of extreme 
distress is an invitation to financial crisis. And fourth, the public-sector 
overseers of systemic risk47 need to be proactive in assuring that the crisis-
prevention and crisis-resolution frameworks are in place for credit provided 
through traditional banking channels, through the capital markets, or by other 
mechanisms of financial intermediation. As we learned with the sovereign debt 
of the 1990s and with the RMBS instruments of today, it is incorrect to assume 
that market participants, in pursuit of their diverse private interests, will take 
the actions needed to adequately address risks to the system as a whole.48 
 
 
 46. See GFSR, supra note 4. In the United States, federal legislation and regulations have been 
proposed or adopted to address many of these risks in the structure of mortgage–backed securities and 
other asset–backed securities. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]; 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 229, 230, 232, 
239, 240, 243 and 249, Asset Backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 9117, Exchange Act Release 
No. 61,858 (proposed Apr. 7, 2010); Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Treatment 
by the FDIC as Conservator or Receiver of Financial Assets Transferred by an Insured Depository 
Institution in Connection with a Securitization or Participation, May 11, 2010 [hereinafter FDIC 
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 47. See Summit Communiqué of the G-20, supra note 6 (setting forth the new role of the Financial 
Stability Board); Press Release, Treasury Outlines Framework for Regulatory Reform, supra note 6 
(focusing on management of systemic risk by a designated systemic risk regulator for the U.S.). 
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